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MAPPING LEGAL METAPHORS IN

CYBERSPACE: EVOLVING THE
UNDERLYING PARADIGM
by

ROBERT REILLYt

I.

INTRODUCTION

The new media's impact on law's specialized information places, on
legal processes and methods that involve the movement of information
over distances, on legal doctrines and concepts that require information
to be contained in some manner, and even on the boundaries of how law
is categorized, still seem to me to be likely, over time, to be
profound... [given the] new ways of managing relationships, with new
ways- of resolving conflicts, with new ways of ordering behavior, and
1
with new ways of storing and sharing information.

For more than 200 years we have linked legal precedents to actions.
This "metaphor 2 mapping" has stretched across a large number of societal and technological changes. It appears that the Web 3 has stretched
some of those concepts to the breaking point. If so, then the law cannot
expect to support the same symbols and metaphors. 4 Thus, an attempt
to map metaphors onto territory that is as unstable, unknown, and
changeable as cyberspace proves to be difficult. It is also problematic to
attempt to apply a metaphor onto a medium such as the Web where
there are so many relationships that overlap.
t Robert Reilly, Ed.D., is the Post Doctoral Research Associate at the University of
Massachusetts at Amherst in the Office of Information Technologies.
1. M. Ethan Katsh, Cybertime, Cyberspace, and Cyberlaw, 1995 J. ONLINE L. 1, T111
(June, 1995) <http://warthog.cc.wm.edu/law/publications/jol/katsh.html>.
2. See GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LrVE By 3 (1980) ("The
concepts that govern our thoughts are not just matters of intellect. They also govern our

everyday functioning, down to the most mundane details. Our concepts structure what we
perceive, how we get around in the world, and how we relate to other people. Our conceptual system thus plays a central role in defining our everyday realities. If we are right in
suggesting that our conceptual system is largely metaphorical, then the way we think,
what we experience, and what we do everyday is very much a matter of metaphor.").
3. "Web" is taken herein to be synonymous with the terms: cyberspace, the Internet,
the Net, the World Wide Web, or WWW.
4. See generally MILNER S. BALL, LYING DowN TOGETHER: LAW,METAPHOR AND THEoLOGy 21-36 (1985).
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Adding to the problem is the fact that the current process of selecting metaphors tends to focus on the mechanical similarities of the different media (e.g., how is a given action like an action if a print metaphor,
or a telephony metaphor were employed). Given the current state of
evolution in which a vast "community" is developing5 and the
demographics of the Web are changing. 6 It may be more productive to
view the Web as an organic entity (e.g., cyberspace is like: a community,
a global brain, a town common). However, shifting metaphors may be a
difficult task, especially when the environment is so abstract.
It is generally simpler . . . for people to consider the impact of a ten
percent rise in gasoline prices than it is for them to consider the impact
of a tenfold increase in the capacity of computer memory chips. Material changes are often concrete and
imaginable; information changes
7
seem very abstract and mystical.
"The shift from print to electronic information technologies provides
the law with a new environment, one that is less fixed, less structured,
less stable and, consequently, more versatile and volatile."8
An organic model would cause those who map metaphors to shift
their paradigm so as to view cyberspace as a place where a society of
people exist-a community is developing, and not as a piece of machinery-a mere technological artifact. An appropriate organic model may
be one in which cyberspace is viewed in the same manner the town commons of 200 years were viewed-a commonly shared community
resource.
II.

THE STATE OF THE ART-GETTING CUT ON THE EDGE

The real question is not whether machines think but whether men
do. The mystery which surrounds a thinking machine already surrounds
a thinking man. 9 Attempting to define which metaphor the various new
technologies fall into is not a new or unique legal activity. For example,
5. See BRUCE STERLING, THE HACKER CRACKDOWN 247 (1995).
6. The Internet is becoming more demographically similar to society in general. See,
e.g., GVUs WWW User Surveys (last modified Jan. 12, 1998) <http://www.gvu.gatech.edu/
user surveys/survey-1997-10/>. Anthony Rutkowski, Executive Director of the Internet
Society, states that "a commonly used method of estimating the total number of Internet
users is to multiply the number of host computers by 10. For example, in 1993, [there
were] about 20 million users." Id.

See also Robert Reilly, TRANSFORMING THE PARADIGM

FOR CRAFrING ACCEPTABLE USE POLICY: MANAGING THE ELECTRONIC COMMONS 5-8 (1997).

See also John S. Quarterman, Internet Communications Services on NSFNET, MATRIX
NEWS, Mar. 3, 1995.

7.

JOSHUA MEYROWITZ, No SENSE OF PLACE: THE IMPACT OF ELECTRONIC MEDIA ON

SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 20 (1985).

8. M. Ethan Katsh, Law in a Digital World, 38 VILL L. REV. 403, 406 (1993).
9. B.F. SKINNER, CONTINGENCIES OF REINFORCEMENT: A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
(1969).
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the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
granted a preliminary injunction blocking enforcement of the Communications Decency Act ("CDA"). 10 The Supreme Court unanimously upheld
this pronouncement.' 1 "One key issue was whether [on-line] media
should be regulated with free speech in mind, as print media are regulated, or should be regulated with community moral values in mind as
are broadcast media."12 The need for resolution of this issue points out
the lack of clarity as to which legal metaphor(s) applies in cyberspace.
Law is a process that is oriented around working with information.
As new modes of working with information emerge, the law cannot be
expected to function or to be viewed in the same manner as it was in an
era in which print was the primary communications medium. Nor can
13
the law expect to support the same symbols and metaphors.
Historically, the Supreme Court does not have a particularly strong
record when dealing with Constitutional issues as they relate to new
technologies. In 1915, the Court stated that motion pictures "[are] not to
be regarded ... as part of the press of the country."14 However, in 1948
the Court stated that "moving pictures . . . are included in the press
5
whose freedom is guaranteed by the First Amendment."'
"It was such myopia that caused early films to be labeled as 'moving
pictures,' rather than to be recognized as a new art form." 16 In the early
days of printing, this line of thought caused the "printing metaphor" to
be embraced by "many powerful institutions." 17 Printing was assumed
to merely be a technological replacement for writing. "These institutions
failed to understand however, that printing could not be controlled as
easily as writing had been and they did not recognize that printing also
10. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 883 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
11. See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2351 (1997).
12. Howard Rheingold, The Tragedy of the Electronic Commons (visited Feb. 13, 1998)
<http://www.well.com/user/hlr/tomorrow /tomorrowcommons.html>.
13. See BALL, supra note 4, at 21-36. The author suggests that current metaphors of
law as bulwark of freedom promote "order" rather than "justice" and that the new conceptual metaphor is needed to open the dam and allow circulation, connection and progress.
Persuasion is also a key function of the metaphor.
Many metaphors have been offered in attempts to capture the nature and meaning of
an on-line computer network. An on-line computer network is analogous to many familiar
real-life metaphors, not just to one. It is analogous to a: newspaper, republisher/disseminator, common carrier (e.g., telephone company), traditional bulletin board (the wood and
cork type), broadcaster, desk at the office, desk at home in the den, free and open frontier,
safe deposit box in a bank, hotel/motel room which one has rented, fraternity/sorority
house. Depending on which metaphor is invoked, the legal perspective of a computer account will vary greatly.
14. Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 236 U.S. 230, 244 (1915).
15. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948).
16. Katsh, supra note 8, at 407.
17. Id.
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changed the larger environment."' 8
In Olmstead v. United States,19 an FBI wiretap was used to obtain
evidence of approximately seventy people who were engaged in a conspiracy to transport and sell liquors in violation of the Eighteenth Amendment (National Prohibition Act of 1919).20 The Court found that the
wiretaps were made without having to physically trespass on private
property because the phone wires were not part of Olmstead's house or
office. The Court ruled that the Fourth Amendment had not been violated as there had been no physical invasion.
However, by 1967 the Court viewed physical invasion differently as
shown in Katz v. United States.2 1 The defendant Katz was convicted in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of California
for violating a statute proscribing interstate transmission of wire communication of bets or wagers, and he appealed. The Court of Appeals
affirmed, 2 2 and certiorariwas granted. The Supreme Court held that the
government's activities of electronically listening to and recording defendant Katz's words spoken into a telephone receiver in a public telephone booth violated the privacy upon which the defendant justifiably
relied while using the telephone booth. 23 Thus, this action constituted a
search and seizure within the Fourth Amendment, and the fact that an
electronic device employed to achieve that end did not happen to pene18. Id. at 408. See also ELIZABETH EISENSTEIN, THE PRINTING PREss As AN AGENT OF

CHANGE 303-13 (1979). In her classic study of the impact of printing, Eisenstein noted that
Church officials hailed printing as a "divine art" and as being "divinely inspired." Id. at
317. Yet as printing was employed in novel ways and as it became a mass medium, individuals became empowered and were able to challenge the Church in ways that had not been
possible in earlier periods. The Reformation was "a movement that was shaped at the very
outset (and in large part ushered in) by the new powers of the press." Id. at 303. Thus, in
1519, when Martin Luther tacked his complaints about the Catholic Church to the church
door in Wittenberg, Germany, the Ninety Five Theses were also printed and circulated
widely. See id. at 306. Eisenstein wrote:
When Luther proposed debate over his Ninety Five Theses, his action was not in
and of itself revolutionary. It was entirely conventional for professors of theology
to hold disputations over an issue such as indulgences and 'church doors were the
customary place for medieval publicity.' But these particular theses did not stay
tacked to the church door (if indeed they were ever really placed there). To a sixteenth century Lutheran chronicler, 'it almost appeared as if the angels themselves has been their messengers and brought them before the eyes of all the
people.' Luther himself expressed puzzlement, when addressing Pope Leo X six
months after the initial event: It is a mystery to me how my theses, more so than
my other writings, indeed those of other professors, were spread to so many places.
They were meant exclusively for our academic circle here.
Id.
19. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
20. Id. at 456-57.
21. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
22. See Katz v. United States, 369 F.2d 130, 136 (9th Cir. 1966).
23. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 347.
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trate the wall of the booth could have no constitutional significance. Furthermore, the Court held that the search and seizure, without prior
judicial sanction and attendant safeguards, did not comply with Constitutional standards. 2 4 Although, accepting the account of the government's actions as accurate, the magistrate could constitutionally have
authorized, with appropriate safeguards, a very limited search and
seizure. The Court essentially rejected the Olmstead notion that there
25
needed to be a "physical intrusion ... [or] trespass."
Recently, the Court appears to be repeating the past 2 6 when in Turner BroadcastingSystem, Inc. v. FCC27 the Court stated that the Red
Lion 28 standard does not apply to cable television (even though it applies
to other media). 29 The "Court often succumb[s] to the temptation to
analogize new electronic media to existing technologies for which they
have already [constitutional] models to rely upon."30 For example, in Los
Angeles v. Preferred Communications,3 1 Justice Blackmun stated that:
"[i]n assessing [constitutional] claims concerning cable access, the Court
must determine whether the characteristics of cable television make it
sufficiently analogous to another medium to warrant application of an
already existing standard, or whether those characteristics require new
analysis." 32 In the vein of promoting a "new analysis," 33 Justice Thomas
has taken issue with the action of the Court in its uneven application of
the law to changing technology. 3 4 He contends that:
[flor many years, we have failed to articulate how and to what extent
the First Amendment protects cable operators, programmers, and viewers from state and federal regulation. I think it is time we did so, and I
cannot go along with the plurality's assiduous attempts to avoid ad24. See id.
25. Id.
26. Compare Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 236 U.S. 230 (1915) with
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948); Also compare Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) with Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
27. Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
28. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). See also Leathers v.
Medlock, 499 U.S. 439 (1991).
29. See Turner, 512 U.S. at 635. "[T]he rationale for applying a less rigorous standard
of First Amendment scrutiny to broadcast regulation ... does not apply in the context of
cable regulation." Id. at 639. "[A]pplication of the more relaxed standard of scrutiny
adopted in Red Lion and the other broadcast cases is inapt when determining the First
Amendment validity of cable regulation." Id.
30. Note, The Message in the Medium: The FirstAmendment on the Information Superhighway, 107 HARv. L. REV. 1062 (1994).
31. Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488 (1986).
32. Id. at 496.
33. Id.
34. Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374, 2418
(1996) (Thomas, J., the Chief Justice, and Scalia, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
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35

Justice Thomas continues his argument by noting: "[tihe text of the
First Amendment makes no distinction between print, broadcast, and
cable media, but we have done so."36
In Red Lion,3 7 the Court held that, in light of the scarcity of broadcasting frequencies, the Government may require a broadcast licensee to
share their frequency with others and to conduct themselves as a proxy
or fiduciary with obligations to present those views and voices which are
representative of their community and which would otherwise, by necessity, be barred from the airwaves. 38
The Court also noted, "[wie thus endowed the public with a right of
access" 39 "to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences." 40 The public right leaves broadcasters with substantial, but not
complete, First Amendment protection of their editorial discretion-a
right that provides a large measure of journalistic freedom, but not as
4t
large as that exercised by a newspaper.
Justice Thomas also notes that, in contrast, "we have not permitted
that level of government interference in the context of the print me43
dia."4 2 In the Miami Herald v. Publ'g v. Tornillo:
[we invalidated a Florida statute that required newspapers to allow,
free of charge, a right of reply to political candidates whose personal or
professional character the paper assailed. We rejected the claim that
the statute was constitutional because it fostered speech rather than
restricted it, as well as a related claim that the newspaper could per44
missibly be made to serve as a public forum.
The Miami Herald court also flatly rejected the argument that the newspaper's alleged media monopoly could justify forcing the paper to speak
45
in contravention of its own editorial discretion.
The lack of understanding as to the nature of computer technology
also occurs at the state level. Judge Easterbrook, of the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals notes "[e]rror in legislation is common, and never more
35. Id.

36. Id. at 2419.
37. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
38. Id. at 389.
39. Denver Area, 116 S. Ct. at 2419 (Thomas J. dissenting).
40. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390.
41. See, e.g., Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94,
117-118 (1973).
42. Denver Area, 116 S. Ct. at 2419 (Thomas J. dissenting).
43. Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
44. Id. at 256, 258.
45. See id. at 256.
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so than when technology is galloping forward." 4 6 In New York, for example, the state legislature considered the passage of telecommunications
47
legislation which seems to ignore fundamental Constitutional issues.
To add to the blurring of the legal landscape, there are a number of
gaps in existing statutes addressing technology itself.48 For example, in
United States v. LaMacchia,4 9 "the question of whether the defendant
had in fact committed any crime at all turned out to be a difficult [question] for authorities to answer."50 LaMacchia's attorney stated: "The
government attempts to assert control over this burgeoning thing called
the Internet [from time to time] ... spasmodically overreacts in order to
set an example, to deter behavior the government doesn't like,"5 1 which
then leads to misapplication of the law.
In the long run, adoption of information technologies will blur the
boundaries between citizens and agency and between agency and court.
Blurring of these boundaries may necessitate rethinking the definitions
of some of the basic events that define the administrative process, public
participation and judicial review. 5 2 For example, "the balance between
speakers' rights and listeners' privacy interests depend largely on how
53
the courts conceptualize the forum in which the speech takes place."
In addition to the gaps being created by this new on-line electronic
technology, a legal and ethical blurring occurs due to the lack of consensus among the various stakeholders as to what legal metaphors apply.
For example, if the Information Superhighway is regarded as analogous
46. Frank H. Easterbrook, Paper presented at the University of Chicago Legal Forum's
Symposium on the Law of Cyberspace (November 1995) (discussing cyberspace and the law
of the horse).
47. Voters Telecommunications Watch, VTW Bill Watch #37 (Feb. 18, 1996) <http:fl
www.vtw.org/archive/960218-234525.html>. New York Internet, a business oriented Internet Service Provider in New York state, suggested that New York State Internet Bill
($210/A3967) was poorly drafted as it had major Constitutional flaws and conflicted with
existing statutes. The major problems were: (1) inappropriate liability for Internet providers, (2) criminalization of speech that is currently legal in print, and, (3) no mention of the
plethora of parental control tools.
48. See David R. Johnson & Kevin A. Marks, Mapping Electronic Data Communications Onto Existing Legal Metaphors: Should We Let Our Conscience (And Our Contracts)
Be Our Guide?, 38 VILL. L. REV. 487, 488 (1993).
49. United States v. LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. 535 (D. Mass. 1994).
50. Mike Godwin, No Copycat Criminal: LaMacchia Case Reveals a Federal Attitude
Problem, (Mar. 1995) <http://www.swissnet.ai.mit.edu/6805/articles/dml/godwin-intemetworld-march95.html>.
51. See Harvey A. Silverglate, Statement of Silverglate and Good Concerningthe Dismissal of the Indictment in U.S. v. David M. LaMacchia (Feb. 11, 1998) <http:/!
www.poto.net/dldfldl-pr-dec-29.text>.
52. See Henry A. Perritt, Jr., The ElectronicAgency and the Traditional Paradigmsof
Administrative Law, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 79, 80 (1992).
53. Note, The Message in the Medium: The FirstAmendment on the Information Superhighway, 107 HI-ev. L. REv. 1062, 1093 (1994).
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to a public space, then First Amendment principles, evident outside of
the electronic media, suggest the burden may be on users of the Information Superhighway to avoid unwanted (and otherwise legal) messages by
averting their eyes. If, however, the Information Superhighway is regarded as analogous to a private phone conversation, then unwanted
messages could be seen as "nuisance calls" and thus potentially
actionable.
Too often the process of analogizing has focused on the technological
or utilitarian similarities of the different media. 54 "Technological characteristics, however, should not be the crucial factor in determining the
protection [technology usage] receives under the [U.S. Constitution]. " 55
We "should ground [our] analysis in essential [constitutional] interests
and draw upon salient technological characteristics only as the factual
background against which the real [constitutional] concerns must be applied ... [and the] Constitution's norms, at their deepest level, must be
invariant under merely technological transformations." 5 6 This position,
while supporting a new analysis, substantially advocates a one-faceted
approach to the crafting of statutes and public policy. There may be
more to the question than simply investigating the basic constitutional
issues and ignoring the technological possibilities. There may be logistical and substantive as well as cultural and social differences in the nature of a new technological media that would provide compelling reasons
to necessitate different standards for a given constitutionally protected
act. 57 If these differences do exist, they must be understood at their
deepest level, not merely analogized to some existing situation or
artifact.
As new modes of understanding the nature of information emerges,
one needs a guide to maneuver through the difficult areas. The best procedure to determine the rights and duties of the participants in electronic networking communities is not to select a particular metaphor,
but rather, to apply basic principles of fairness and justice. In the case of
cyberspace, this means evolving the underlying paradigm to reflect its
developing organic nature.
54. See supra note 32.
55. Note, supra note 53, at 1066.
56. Laurence H. Tribe, Address at the First Conference on Computers, Freedom and
Privacy Boston, Mass. (last modified July 1, 1997) <http://www.swissnet.ai.mit.edu/6095/
articles /tribe-constitution.txt>.
57. Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 496 (1986) (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("In assessing [constitutional] claims concerning cable access, the
Court must determine whether the characteristics of cable television make it sufficiently
analogous to another medium to warrant application of an already existing standard, or
whether those characteristics require new analysis.").
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EVOLVING THE NATURE OF A METAPHOR: MECHANICAL
TOWARDS ORGANIC

Since the inception of networked data communications systems,
commentators attempted to analyze the rights and duties of participants
in these systems by mapping the systems against existing relationships
in order to try to pick the "right" metaphor. These attempts, however,
accupresuppose that there is some "best fit," some metaphor that will
58
rately characterize all the activities involved in these systems.
Milner S. Ball suggests the metaphors of law promote order rather
than justice.59 "As the predominant form of communication shifts from
print to electronic, away from printed volumes of statutes, regulations
and court opinions and even further away from carvings on stone, legal
60
metaphors will also change to reflect the changes in communication."
It is far from certain that any mechanical metaphor (e.g., superhighway,
printing press, telephone) is solely appropriate to cyberspace. Perhaps
advocating for a new analysis is more accurate. A new analysis will necessitate a rethinking of the underlying mechanical-based metaphor(s)
which define cyberspace toward inclusion of organic-based metaphors.
Fredrick Schauer observed "[1]egal rules and principles commonly
contain not only normative determinations about what ought or ought
not happen under certain circumstances, but also background factual assumptions about the nature of the world."6 1 "As the form of information
changes from something tangible to something electronic, changes will
occur in legal institutions and processes that have been oriented around
that have
particular physical spaces, and in legal concepts and doctrines
62
depended upon a relationship with a particular space."
The new technologies, as the term cyberspace implies, allow those who
work with information to overcome existing spatial boundaries and barriers to communication. Cyberspace does not mean that all territorial,
institutional, doctrinal, or conceptual boundaries are replaced and become irrelevant, but cyberspace does overlay a whole new set of oppor58. See Johnson & Marks, supra note 48, at 487.
59. See BALL, supra note 4. Ball has pointed out that current legal metaphors may be
based on earlier forms of communications. He suggests:
The conceptual system of law as the rampart of civilization is at least partially
reinforced by a metonymy, the identification of or reference to law by the early
means of its recordation and communication: the two tablets of stone which Moses
bore to the Israelites, for example, or the stele, an eight-foot diorite shaft, on which
the Code of Hammurabi was inscribed. The jurisprudence of the past has attributes of a quarry.
Id. at 23, n.12.
60. Id. at 112.
61. Fredrick Schauer, Free Speech and the Demise of the Soapbox, 84 COLtJM. L. REV.
558, 558 (1984) (reviewing Ithiel de Sola Pool, TECHNOLOGIES AND FREEDOM (1985)).
62. Katsh, supra note 1, $ 6.
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tunities for overcoming physical distances and creating and shaping
virtual spaces. It is for this reason, and because new levels of informational interactions emerge that may not have existed before, that legal
questions touching on the use of space, such as jurisdiction, become
more complicated. More fundamentally, legal arrangements that assume something about the use and communication of information over
space, such as the regulation or definition of the legal profession or a
contract between several parties in different places, become
63
vulnerable.
For example, encryption as a technology has confounded law enforcement's ability to conduct searches as it has traditionally done. Attorney General Janet Reno has noted that:
Encryption can frustrate completely our ability to lawfully search and
seize evidence and to conduct electronic surveillance, two of the most
effective tools that the law and the people of this country have given to
law enforcement to do its work ....
[Tioday we can, with a court order
secured under a careful procedure to protect the privacy of innocent
people, wiretap a communication. But if the communication is encrypted, the court order has no value. Therefore, our goal must be to
encourage strong encryption for privacy in commerce [while] preserving
law enforcement's ability to protect public safety and national
64
security.
Furthermore, if one's right to privacy in cyberspace is to be endowed
with protections equal to one's real-world right to privacy, it should be
understood that, inter alia, in cyberspace, privacy is in the conceptual
65
phase of development than it is a well defined statute.
63. See id.

25.

64. Janet Reno, An address presented to the Commonwealth Club of California, San
Francisco, Cal., Law Enforcement and Cyberspace (June 14, 1996).
65. For cyberspace, the privacy tort seems to be ill defined. The three of the four torts
(appropriation of another's name, unreasonable publicity to a private person, and false
light) seem to be blind to the fact that the tort might occur on-line. In real life, a tort for
'intrusion upon seclusion' seems to generally be prosecuted through another statute (e.g.,
trespass, breaking and entering). Here the concept of invasion of privacy is defined by
other statutes which encompass a physical intrusion of some sort.
Dean Prosser classified the privacy tort into ". . . four separate causes of action," or
forms of invasion of privacy. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960). As a
result of Prosser's article, and, as a result of his being the drafter of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, these classifications have been recognized in a large number of court
decisions.
These categories of invasion have been described as "distinct wrongs," Phillips v. Smalley Maintenance Serv., 435 So. 2d 705 (Ala. 1983); and as, "loosely related but distinct
[causes of action]." Sun v. Langston, 316 S.E.2d 172 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984)). They are: an
unreasonable intrusion upon seclusion, see id.; appropriation of a person's name and/or
likeness for commercial use/benefit, see, e.g., McCall v. Courier-Journal, 623 S.W.2d 882
(Ky. 1981); Struner v. Dispatch Printing, 442 N.E.2d 129 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982); Covington
v. Houston Post, 743 S.W.2d 345 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS,
§§ 68, 625A(2)(b) (1977); unreasonable publicity given to a person's private life, see, e.g.,
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Given the nature of cyberspace, common real-world logistical barriers are significantly altered, and those changes must be accommodated.
We must merge and adapt our understanding of real life with the everevolving realities of the Web.
As the electronic culture matures, our language will eventually respond to the proliferation of informational contexts by providing us with
more specialized and appropriate terms. Our language will then reflect
the new kinds of informational spaces and imprecise or inaccurate metaphors will no longer have the same kind of influence on our thinking and
perception that they have had for the last twenty years. As print related
terms are used less often, the lens through which we view electronic
space will put the novel qualities of cyberspace into clear focus. Assumptions that have been made as to who should control or organize cyber66
space will be reassured.
Perhaps the time has come to revise our thinking in regard to many
of the technologies that have developed in the past years and restructure
the underlying legal perspective attached to them. This will cause new
metaphors to evolve which view cyberspace as less of a mechanical entity
and more of an organic entity.
IV. A NEW PARADIGM: MANAGING THE
ELECTRONIC COMMONS
Only the Law resists and resents the notion that it should ever 6change
7
its antiquated ways to meet the challenge of a changing world.
The notion of cyberspace as a 'commonly shared resource' is a powerful model upon which to perform a new analysis. This shift from a
mechanical-based model to one that asserts that an organic-based model
be part of its nature is a significant one. "[Slince the barrier between the
natural and computer sciences is often high and opaque... "68 it is necessary to provide some background in regard to the concept of managing
a commonly shared resource. One position that appears to be quite powerful is that of biologist Garrett Hardin 6 9 who:
[iun 1968 .. .brought to science's attention a little-known work by the
nineteenth century amateur mathematician William Forster Lloyd on
McCall, 623 S.W.2d 882; Struner, 442 N.E.2d 129; Covington, 743 S.W.2d 345; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §§ 68, 625A(2)(b); and, placing a person in a false light before the
public, see, e.g., Cantrell v. Forest City Pub., 419 U.S. 245 (1974); Hogin v. Cottingham, 533
So. 2d 525 (Ala. 1988); Goodrich v. Waterbury Republican-Am., Inc., 448 A.2d 1317 (Conn.
1982); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §§ 120, 625A(2)(d).
66. See Katsh, supra note 8, at 470.

67.

FRED RODELL, WOE UNTO You, LAWYERS!

23 (1939).

68. Roy M. Turner, The Tragedy of the Commons and DistributedAl Systems (visited
July 1, 1997) <http://cdps.umcs.maine.edu/Papers/1993/TofCommons/ TR.html>.
69. See Garret Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
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population growth and control. Lloyd examined the fate of a 70
common
pasture shared among rational, utility-maximizing herdsmen.
Shepherds grazed their herds on the individual parcels of land they
owned. But there was another pasture, a large public stretch of land
held in reserve, owned in common by the villagers and known, logically
enough, as the common. Then, some shepherds became greedy.
They began guiding their sheep to the common each day, preferring
to wear out the public pasture because they thought it cost them nothing
and saved their own small patches. Soon, others joined in, unwilling to
deplete their lands. It wasn't long before the common was turned into a
muddy wasteland-useless to anyone. As the shepherds watched their
individual pastures fall to overgrazing, they realized that their village
had been sacked by its own people. They had stolen their shared livelihood, economic security, cultural center, and much of their village's
71
beauty from themselves and their children.
The inexorable working out of the resource's ruin is Garrett Hardin's
The Tragedy of the Commons (or perhaps more aptly identified as 'The
Tragedy of the Unmanaged Common'). In human affairs, the tragedy of
the common has never been more evident than it is today. Its effects are
pollution, global warming, ozone depletion, overfishing and extinction of
species, abuse of aquifers, and destruction of the rain forests. "[These]
problems are caused by a system of open access to commonly owned resources." 72 At the heart of this is the free-rider or the overgrazer, and
the issue of regulating use of a shared community resource-developing
a community of people as opposed to (in the case of cyberspace) a community of printing presses, or, a conglomeration of superhighways.
Cyberspace is experiencing social dilemmas, which are common to
humans interacting with each other. 73 But the existence of social dilemmas has not yet caused the focus of policy development or statute enactment for the Web to change from a mechanical-based model to a model
which accounts for the organic-based nature of the Web. The academic
community has been aware of the social dilemmas for a brief time. However, there has not been a wide ranging discussion of the issues and possible models to address these issues. Today the subject is just beginning

70. Turner, supra note 68.
71. Hardin, supra note 69.
72. Randy T. Simmons et. al., The Tragedy of the Commons Revisited: Politics vs. Private Property (visited Dec. 15, 1997) <http://www.cei.org/essays/simmonsl.html>.

73. The growth of social issues on the Net is reflected in the dramatic growth of the
existence of Mailing Lists and UseNet newsgroups that address such issues. A search of
Altavista (altavista.digital.com) for the term "Intellectual Property" produced 68,637 hits
and for "Privacy" produced 39,131 hits.
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to be discussed 74 and to appear in the general press, but little has been
written in regard to its impact on the Web.
The challenge confronting those who inhabit/manage cyberspace is
how a group-a very large and demographically diverse group-can "organize and govern themselves to obtain collective benefits in situations
where the temptations to free-ride and/or to break commitments are substantial."75 As Harold Innis (Marshall McLuhan's colleague and mentor)
has suggested, the introduction of a new medium of communications sets
in motion deep-rooted change in important societal institutions by influ76
encing their orientations to existing traditions.
In regard to managing cyberspace, Professor David Post indicates
that "[i]ncreasing attention is currently paid to important and interesting questions about the rules that will, or should, govern behavior within
the global networked environment." 7 7 Post wonders what the governance mechanism will be like given such questions as:
What shape should copyright protection take in a world of instantaneous, cost less, and undetectable copying? Should the First Amendment
be interpreted to encompass a right to post anonymous messages, or
commercial messages, across Usenet groups, or a right to send encrypted messages that are, for all intents and purposes, immune to
eavesdropping by law enforcement? What standard of liability should
be imposed on system operators in regard to the availability of "obscene" material on their systems? 78 . . . Before we try to answer the
substantive questions-before we try to decide what the 'best' copyright
law for the global network might look like-we should pause to consider
a necessarily antecedent question: what mechanisms exist whereby
such a law could be implemented? Who can make and enforce the rules
in cyberspace, whatever the substantive content of those rules might
9
be?

7

In researching the models for behavioral control, Ellickson's research identified a model that outlines five levels of "controllers" by
which an individual's behavior are governed. These "controllers" (as
74. See, e.g., Rheingold, supra note 12; Jay Hanson, Tragedy of the Commons Re-stated
(visited Dec. 15, 1997) <http://dieoff.org /pagel09.htm>; Amy Friedlander, The Fatheringof
an Ideology: The Persistent Malthusian Paradigm (visited Dec. 15, 1997) <http:ll
www.brown.edu/Courses/BioCommunity-Healthl68C/malthus.htm>; Graham Finnie, Distance is No Object (visited Dec. 15, 1997) <http://www.teledot.com/0896/opinion/
tdc0896worldview.html>.
75. ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR
COLLECTIVE ACTION 27 (1990).
76. See MARSHALL McLuHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA 23 (1964).
77. David G. Post, Anarchy, State, and the Internet: An Essay on Law-Making in
Cyberspace, 1995 J. ONLINE L. 3, 1 2 (visited Feb. 11, 1998) <http://www.wm.edulaw/publications/jollpost.html>.
78. Id.
79. Id. 14.
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shown in Table 1) are: the actor him/herself, other individuals being acted upon, non-hierarchically organized social forces, hierarchically-organized non-governmental organizations, and, governments.8 0
TABLE 1: FRAMEWORK FOR BEHAVIORAL CONTROLS8 1
LEVEL

CONTROLLER

1
2

The Actor him/herself
Second Party
Controllers (e.g., the
person acted upon)
Non-hierarchically
organized social
forces
Hierarchically
organized nongovernmental
organizations
Governments

3
4

5

SUBSTANTIVE RULES

SANCTION

Personal Ethics
Contractual
provisions

Self-Sanction
Various self-help
provisions

Social norms

Social sanctions

Organizational rules

Organizational
sanctions

Laws

State enforcement,
coercive sanctions

To illustrate this framework, Post considers various rules that "combine to determine the frequency with which a particular behavior-say,
the transmission of messages containing any of the FCC's 'seven dirty
words' might occur on my university's local area network. Each network
participant may have a personal ethical position in regard to the propri8 2
ety or impropriety of such messages."
One can imagine-not terribly realistically, perhaps, in this context-bilateral agreements between network users regarding the use of
particular words in e-mail messages or in files stored on the network, or
even resort to self-help (in the form of authorized or unauthorized file
deletion) by individual network users. Each of these is, in turn, at least
partially determined by each user's response to various social forces such
as cultural or professional norms. Formal or informal organization rules
promulgated by the network administrators may apply to this conduct,
as may federal or state laws regarding the transmission of "obscene"
8 3
messages.
80. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAw: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE Dis123-27 (1991).
81. Id. at 127-28 (citing Frank I. Michelman, States' Rights and States' Roles:
Permutationsof 'Sovereignty' in National League of Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE L.J. 1165, 1167
(1984). The column labeled "Level" was added for the purpose of identification for this
PUTES

article.
82. Post, supra note 77,
83. See id. 1 10.

9.
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The question becomes "whose rules will govern behavior in cyberspace?" 84 It is also important to understand "how ... the competition
among these controllers proceed? What are the 'controller-selecting
rules' that determine which controller's rules take precedence in the
85
event of conflict?"
Our federal government has employed Garrett Hardin's call for "mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon"8 6 theory as the intellectual justification upon which to base nearly three decades of environmental
legislation (Table 1, Level 5).87 However,
[a] s that legislation developed, ideology and politics combined to select a
narrow set of tools [for] managing the environment, primarily prohibition and command-and-control regulations. But these policy tools do
not address underlying causes of... [the] problems, ignore some fundamental lessons of the Tragedy of the Commons [as described
by Hardin]
88
and place impossible demands on the political process.
While Hardin's thesis turns our thought process in the direction of
viewing cyberspace as a shared community resource-an organic entity-Professor David Post notes that a state's ability "to impose sanctions on law-violators is fundamentally constrained by the need for
physical proximity and physical control."8 9 Post also observes that the
sanctions will "vary in their ability to enforce whatever rules they choose
to adopt, depending on the existence of conflicting higher-level controllers, and on the possibility that those who are subject to the rules can
change jurisdictions to seek a more favorable rule set."90
84. Id. 1 11.
85. Id.
To take a concrete example, how would the [now defunct] Communications Decency Act [have affected] the frequency with which 'indecent' or 'obscene' communications appear in any particular network community if the proscriptions in that
Act conflicted with other behavioral 'controllers' within that community? And
most specifically, what are the special characteristics of electronic networks that
might influence the way in which these controller-selecting rules operate?

Id.
86. Hardin, supra note 69.
87. See Simmons et al., supra note 72.
88. Id.
89. Post, supra note 77,
34.
Such mechanisms, however, entail additional enforcement costs, both in terms of
the direct costs of projecting sovereign power extra-territorially and the costs of
coordinating and harmonizing the legal regimes of competing sovereigns. Thus,
United States law is not ordinarily applicable to, nor can the United States ordinarily apply sanctions on, a network operator in, say, Singapore; attempts by the
United States to go around these limitations require either some means of obtaining control over the network operator or its assets, or some measure of cooperation with State authorities in Singapore or other jurisdictions where the operator
maintains physical assets on which judgments can be executed.
Id.
35.
90. Id. T 1.
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The notion that there must be state control of the Web should not be
completely dismissed nor significantly diminished. Attempts by the federal government may not have been successful in managing the electronic commons as they may lack an understanding that there may be:
no principle more important for understanding rule-making in cyberspace than that of distinguishing between the Internet as a whole and
the individual networks that are its component members; it is indeed
the interplay between the vast number of largely centralized individual
networks and the decentralized internetwork through which they can
communicate that will prove to be of fundamental importance in determining the efficacy with
which state law can be imposed on individual
91
network communities.
92
The Internet "proves relatively resistant to centralized control."
As far as state enforced statutes are concerned, Beryl Crowe notes that
in "the past, those who no longer subscribed to the values of the dominant culture were held in check by the myth that the state possessed a
monopoly on, [what Hardin refers to as] coercive force." 9 3 However, this
myth has undergone "continual erosion since the end of World War II
owing to the success of the strategy of guerrilla warfare, as first revealed
to the French in Indochina, and later conclusively demonstrated in Algeria."94 While the observations made by Hardin were correct, and his
Tragedy of the Commons theory is powerful and an interesting metaphor
upon which to redefine the nature of the Internet, its underlying assumptions 9 5 may not be accurate and applicable today.9 6 Crowe states
that:
91. Id.
33.
The State's ability to impose sanctions on law-violators is fundamentally constrained by the need for physical proximity and physical control. This is by no
means an absolute constraint; mechanisms do exist, of course, whereby individual
sovereigns can impose their rules on persons or entities not physically present in
the area over which the sovereign has control.
Id. 134.
92. Id.
4. Applying a "legal centralism," Post notes that this 'centralized' form of
inquiry:
focuses on alternative sets of substantive laws-with an eye toward determining
which set is optimal in terms of some pre-defined criterion such as aggregate welfare. This is an entirely appropriate model for an inquiry where some law-making
body-typically a sovereign government-is in a position to choose the optimal set of
laws.
Id. % 3 (citing Oliver W. Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support
Exchange, 73 AM. EcoN. REv. 519, 520, 537 (1983).
93. Beryl Crowe, The Tragedy of the Commons Revisited (visited Dec. 15, 1997) <http://
www.dieoff.org /pagel09.htm>.
94. Id.
95. See id.
In passing the technically insoluble problems over to the political and social realm
for solution, Hardin made three critical assumptions:
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[I]t is apparent that the myth of the monopoly of coercive force as it was
first qualified in the civil rights conflict in the South, then in our urban
ghettos, next on the streets of Chicago, and... on our college campuses
has lost its hold over the minds of Americans. The technology of guerrilla warfare has made it evident that, while the state can win battles, it
cannot win wars of values .... The factor that sustained the myth of
coercive force in the past was the acceptance of a common value system.
97
Whether the latter exists is questionable in the modern nation-state.
Adopting a similar point of view in regard to governmental control of
the Net, Post notes that a:
state will experience obvious difficulties in attempting to monitor the
behavior of individual network users, who are numerous and dispersed
across many such networks. Because each such network functions as a
gatekeeper for its users in cyberspace, however, we might expect that
governments will try to rely instead on their ability to impose coercive
(1) that there exists, or can be developed, a 'criterion of judgment and system
of weighting . . .' that will 'render the incommensurable ...

commensurable

.

.. ' in real life;

(2) that, possessing this criterion of judgment, 'coercion can be mutually
agreed upon,' and that the application of coercion to effect a solution to
problems will be effective in modem society; and
(3) that the administrative system, supported by the criterion of judgment
and access to coercion, can and will protect the commons from further
desecration.
Id. at 55.
96. Id. at 56.
In the United States today, however, there is emerging a new set of behavior patterns which suggest that the myth is either dead or dying. Instead of believing
and behaving in accordance with the myth, large sectors of the population are developing life-styles and value hierarchies that give contemporary Americans an
appearance more closely analogous to the particularistic, primitive forms of'tribal'
organizations in geographic proximity than to that shining new alloy, the American civilization.
Id. at 59.
In looking for the cause of the erosion of the myth of a common value system, it
seems to me that so long as our perceptions and knowledge of other groups were
formed largely through the written media of communication, the American myth
that we were a giant melting pot of equalitarians could be sustained. In such a
perceptual field it is tenable, if not obvious, that men are motivated by interests.
Interests can always be compromised and accommodated without undermining
our very being by sacrificing values. Under the impact of electronic media, however, this psychological distance has broken down and now we discover that these
people with whom we could formerly compromise on interests are not, after all,
really motivated by interests but by values. Their behavior in our very living room
betrays a set of values, moreover, that are incompatible with our own, and consequently the compromises that we make are not those of contract but of culture.
While the former are acceptable, any form of compromise on the latter is not a
form of rational behavior but is rather a clear case of either apostasy or heresy.
Thus we have arrived not at an age of accommodation but one of confrontation. In
such an age 'incommensurables' remain 'incommensurable' in real life.
97. Id.
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sanctions on network administrators (and thereby on the network
rules) in order to implement their own particular preferred set of rules
on behavior in this environment.98
Providing a modern day perspective for Hardin's work in regard to
the Tragedy of the Commons, Amy Friedlander notes that:
Hardin foresaw a tragedy in part because the commons is ultimately a
finite resource. But the economics of advanced technology does not always obey the models of classical economics, which have dealt well with
fixed resources, scarcity, and competition. Indeed, an over-abundance
of information resources is motivating much of the research .

.

. and

suggests that scarcity is not a concern-although it has been argued
that human attention, or "mind share", is finite and hotly contested,
and the resources to manage information are definitely limited. Still,
the tension captured in Hardin's powerful analogy between what is individual and what is shared remains a useful one, and reminds us that
recognizing the commons sometimes depends on who is leading the
9
cow.

9

V.

CONCLUSION

There is an "increasing recognition among contemporary social
scientists that there is a subset of problems, such as population, atomic
war, environmental corruption, and the recovery of a livable environment, for which there are no current political [(legislative)] solutions." 10 0
Thus, it appears to be necessary to view cyberspace not as a one dimensional or purely mechanical entity. Removing this constraint removes
the view that cyberspace can only be controlled by governments through
laws that impose state-enforced coercive sanctions. This causes cyberspace to be viewed as a living organism that is to be shared by a diverse
community of users. Randy T. Simmons' conclusion, after evaluating the
pros and cons of various management issues l 0 1 was that resource management can be greatly improved "by relying more on property rights
10 2
and market forces and less on political management."

98. Post, supra note 77,

31.

99. Amy Friedlander, The Tragedy of the Commons, Revisited (Again) (visited Dec. 15,

1997) <http://www.dlib.org/dlib/april96/04edtorial.html> (emphasis added).
100. Beryl Crowe, The Tragedy of the Commons Revisited, (Dec. 16, 1997) <http:ll
www.dlib.orgldlib/april96/04edtorial.html>.
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